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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
functioned as a market regulator, but its responsibilities were limited.
Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)', the SEC
regulated public offerings of securities. Pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),2 the SEC had a mandate to
maintain fair and orderly secondary markets in securities, and did so by
enforcing anti-manipulation provisions of the Exchange Act,
disciplining broker-dealers and their associated personnel and
overseeing the national securities exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Initially, the NASD was an
association of over-the-counter (OTC) broker-dealers, but it later
became a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for all broker-dealers.
Promulgating short selling rules was one of the SEC's original
mandates, and the SEC did so through the "uptick" rule with regard to
listed securities.4 The SEC also had responsibility for enforcing the net
capital rule, but the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was primarily
responsible for enforcing this rule against NYSE member firms. 5 The
Exchange Act also addressed the regulation of securities credit. While
the Federal Reserve Board promulgated these regulations, the SEC
enforced them against broker-dealers, but not against banks or nonbank,
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1. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (2006)).
2. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006)).
3. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FiN. 151 (2008).
4. See generally David C. Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1990).
5. The SEC permitted broker-dealers to comply with the net capital rules of their SRO if the
SRO's rule was more stringent than the SEC's rule. Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised
Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615,676 (2000).
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noninvestment bank lenders.
6
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) did not exist
until 1974, when the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 7 was
passed. Before then, the Department of Agriculture regulated
commodities futures and commodities exchanges, and that Department
did not transfer authority to the CFTC until 1975.8 That same year, the
1975 Act Amendments to the Exchange Act 9 gave the SEC the
responsibility to facilitate the creation of a national market system for
securities trading. Since many of the same firms that traded securities
also traded commodities, and the CFTC was patterned to some extent
upon the SEC, Congress could have given the SEC responsibility for
monitoring futures trading and futures exchanges. However, when the
White House offered Ray Garrett, Chair of the SEC and a corporate
finance lawyer, regulatory jurisdiction over the futures markets, he
declined this opportunity.10 His response was probably unfortunate,
since in 1975, the CFTC approved the first futures contracts on
securities, including the Chicago Board of Trade's (CBOT) futures
contract on Government National Mortgage Association certificates
(Ginnie Mae's), and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's (CME) futures
contract on ninety-day Treasury Bills.'1 Although the CFTC was given
exclusive jurisdiction over exchange-traded futures contracts, the
explosive growth of derivatives in the years after 1975 set off a
jurisdictional battle between the SEC and the CFTC over the regulation
of financial futures. Creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) in 1973 exacerbated the dispute about whether financial futures
were commodities or securities, because options on securities came to be
regulated by the SEC in a different manner than the regulation of futures
on securities, by the CFTC. 2
6. See 15 U.S.C. 78g(a) (2006). Also, SROs had their own margin rules, which were more
stringent than federal margin requirements.
7. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2006)).
8. THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 45 n.8 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT].
9. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Exchange Act).
10. John D. Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolidation,
36 VILL. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1991) (citing Schneider & Schapiro, What Corporate Lawyers Should
Know About Commodity Futures Law, in 21ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 71
(1990)).
II. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 46.
12. See Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regulatory
Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 786-90 (1983).
THE FUTURE OF THE SEC
In the midst of Wall Street's financial meltdown in 2008 and the
ensuing change of Administrations in Washington, the head of the
SEC, 13 former SEC chairs 14 and the trade association for the securities
industry (SIFMA) 15 were on record recommending a merger of the SEC
and the CFTC. The Acting Head of the CFTC demurred, calling for
three regulators to focus on risk, market integrity, and investor
protection, into which both the SEC and the CFTC would be folded.' 6
A "three peaks" consolidation of all federal financial regulators also has
been urged by securities industry trade associations.' The Treasury
Blueprint for financial regulatory reform, published earlier in 2008, also
advocated consolidating the regulators for securities and derivatives
markets. 18 In addition, the Blueprint recommended that the SEC adopt
"core principles" for exchanges and clearing agencies, as well as an
expedited approval process for rules of self-regulatory organizations
(SROs). 19 This mode of regulation was patterned after the mandate
given to the CFTC in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (CFMA), to engage in principles-based, rather than rule-based
regulation. Since the United States is the only country where
regulation of securities and financial futures is conducted by different
regulatory agencies, 21 whether to combine the SEC and the CFTC has
been discussed for many years. The debates on this topic have been by
13. Karey Wutkowski, SEC's Cox says supports merger of agency, CFTC, REUTERS, Oct. 24,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE49NOMY20081024.
14. Arthur Levitt, How to Restore Confidence in Our Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at
AI5; Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Regulation of Investment Banks by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 9-10 (2008) (testimony of David S. Ruder, Former Chairman, SEC), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/-files/RuderSenateTestimonyMay72008.pdf.
15. The Future of Financial Services Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
I 10th Cong. 7 (2008) (testimony of T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., President and CEO, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts.
Ass'n), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearingI 10/t._ryan 102108.pdf.
16. Kara Scannell, CFTC's Chief: 3 Regulators for 2, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at C3.
17. See, e.g., Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Recommendations for Reorganizing U.S.
Regulatory Structure 4 (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.capmktsreg.orglpdfs/CCMR%20-
%20Recommendations%20for%20Reorganizing%20the%20US%20Regulatory%2OStructure.pdf; INv.
CO. INST., FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM: DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5
(2009); Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11 th Cong. (2009) (testimony of T. Timothy Ryan, Jr.,
President and CEO, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n), available at
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/pdf/Ryan-03-10-2009.pdf.
18. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 137-38.
19. Id. at 106.
20. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12,& 15 U.S.C.).
21. Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON
REG. 279, 282 (1997).
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academics, 22  and policy makers, 23  but the financial crisis has
highlighted some of the problems of the U.S. system of functional
regulation, with its proliferation of financial regulators.
The predicates for the Treasury Blueprint recommendations were
product convergence, inefficiencies of a functional approach to
regulation, and globalization of the capital markets.24  Prior
governmental recommendations for either a merger of the SEC and the
CFTC, or at least better coordination between them, were predicated on
the need for better surveillance and enforcement of intermarket trading,
and a need to monitor systemic risk and reduce volatility in the capital
markets.25 A sitting SEC Commissioner has advocated merging the
SEC and the CFTC, and the current SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro,
advocated merger many years ago when she was an SEC
commissioner.26 Schapiro is more equivocal about a merger now.2 7
Significantly, neither the SEC nor the CFTC had meaningful jurisdiction
to halt or limit trading in the financial products that led to the current
financial crisis.
The Blueprint was a highly political document issued in the last year
of the Bush Administration-at the nadir of government pressures for
deregulation-by a Secretary of the Treasury who was the former head
of Goldman Sachs & Co. The Blueprint contains a not very subtle
criticism of the way the SEC, pursuant to its statutory obligations to
regulate exchanges and markets, has administered relevant provisions of
the Exchange Act. While the Obama Administration has not adopted the
22. See, e.g., id.; Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and For Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REv. 137,
176 (1991).
23. See Christopher L. Culp, Stock Index Futures and Financial Market Reform: Regulatory
Failure or Regulatory Imperialism?, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 517, 517-18 (1991); Stephen J.
Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm For Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to
There, 43 MD. L. REv. 413,448 (1984); Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation
and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEx. L. REv.
1431, 1495-1500 (1991).
24. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 106-09.
25. See H.R. 718, Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act of 1995: Hearings
Before the H. Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., Sec., and GSEs of the Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.,
104th Cong. 224 (1995) (prepared statement of James L. Bothwell, Director, Fin. Insts. & Mkts. Issues,
Gen. Gov't. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office).
26. Jesse Westbrook, SEC Should Police Swaps, Merge with CFTC, Walter Says, BLOOMBERG,
Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ajEyt7d_5xoY&refer=us;
Kevin G. Salwen, Nominee for SEC Supports CFTC on Index Futures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at
A7A.
27. See Richard Hill, Schapiro Tells House Panel SEC To Weigh Wide-Ranging Reform
Proposals, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 446 (Mar. 16, 2009). But she may be more capable of
effecting such a merger than past chairs. See Floyd Norris, Can Mary Schapiro Save the S.E.C.?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/l 7/can-she-save-the-sec/.
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deregulatory philosophy of the Blueprint, it continues to be discussed as
a viable framework for financial regulatory reform. Moreover, the
Obama Administration's recommendations for financial regulatory
reform (Treasury White Paper) do not break much new ground, and do
not recommend consolidating the SEC and the CFTC.28 Policymakers
should, nevertheless, seriously consider merging the SEC and the CFTC.
A new systemic risk regulator for financial institutions is also under
consideration and may take some market regulation responsibilities
away from the SEC. Other proposals, such as the creation of a new
business conduct regulator for financial institutions and markets, or a
financial consumer products protection agency, could result in the
transfer of some of the SEC's market regulation functions to another
agency.29 Making the Federal Reserve Board a more powerful financial
stability regulator, as recommended by the Blueprint and the Treasury
White Paper, 30 has to some extent already occurred, but would not
reduce market volatility or control the proliferation of questionable
financial products unless the Federal Reserve Board becomes more
committed to reducing leverage and speculation than it has for many
years. Barney Frank, House Financial Services Committee Chair, at one
time asserted that the SEC and the CFTC should be merged and that the
Federal Reserve Board or a new systemic risk regulator should oversee
the risks that led to the market meltdown in 2008. 3 1 There remain,
however, many different views on whether there should be limited or
total merger of federal financial regulatory agencies, and what the role
of the Federal Reserve Board should be. 32 Further, as of the date of this
Article, neither a merger of the SEC and the CFTC, nor any other
meaningful consolidation of financial regulators appears likely.
Part II of this Article summarizes the jurisdictional conflicts between
the SEC and the CFTC and explains how their regulatory philosophies
28. See THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE
PAPER].
29. Current versions of legislation to create a consumer financial protection agency do not take
away the SEC's authority over any financial products or markets. See Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009, 111 th Cong. (as reported by the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Dec. 9,
2009); see also Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 11 th Cong. (ordered to be
reported by the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Dec. 2, 2009).
30. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 146-48; TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 22-24.
31. Kara Scannell, Frank Backs Regulator for Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at C3.
SIFMA also has backed a financial stability regulator separate from the SEC. See Testimony of T.
Timothy Ryan, Jr., supra note 15, at 3-6.
32. See Malini Manickavasagam, Senate Hearing Underscores Divisions Over Idea of Fed as
Systemic Risk Regulator, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 450 (Mar. 16, 2009).
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regarding market regulation have diverged. I believe that in recent
years, both agencies have been more interested in promoting new
trading markets and the U.S. securities industry than in keeping existing
markets fair and orderly.
Part III will discusses why the SEC and the CFTC have remained
separate. It argues that the SEC and the CFTC have not been
consolidated because of competitive and political factors in the
securities industry, combined with Congressional politics. Although
consolidating the SEC and the CFTC could solve some of the problems
in the capital markets, as soon as regulatory reform was discussed in
response to the financial crisis, the congressional oversight committees
for the SEC and the CFTC began playing politics and resisting
consolidation of the agencies. 33  Further, the Obama Administration
threw in the towel on this consolidation without a fight.34 In any event,
Congress should not merge these regulators unless it also revises, or
instructs a combined SEC and CFTC to revise, the statutory frameworks
for regulating securities and financial futures. The difficulties of such a
project are demonstrated by the hearings on harmonization of SEC and
CFTC regulation. 35 Part III also discusses the general opposition of
successive Administrations to regulation that would dampen leverage
and speculation or curtail the expansion of derivatives, even though the
securities markets confronted serious problems in 1987 and 1995 caused
by derivatives trading.
Part IV of this Article suggests several areas where SEC market
regulation has failed and new areas where the SEC, or a combined SEC
and CFTC, or some new regulator, should focus with respect to market
regulation. These areas are broker-dealer capital adequacy, credit and
other OTC derivatives trading, short sales, and regulation of hedge
funds. Part V concludes with the hope for a better working relationship
between financial regulators to create better regulation of the securities
industry and markets.
The provisions of the Exchange Act dealing with regulation of the
securities markets were passed in 1975 in order to unfix commission
rates, integrate exchange and OTC markets, inject greater competition
into the trading markets, and give the SEC authority to regulate clearing
agencies, transfer agencies, and other market intermediaries. The SEC
administered this statute in a heavy-handed manner, according to
detailed rules, which may have been one of the many factors leading to
33. See Richard Hill, Lawmakers' Attention Continues to be Focused on Speculation, OTC
Clearing, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 128 (Jan. 26, 2009).
34. See Better broth, still too many cooks, ECONOMIST, June 20, 2009, at 13.
35. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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the explosion of unregulated trading markets in both securities and
derivatives. In 2000 Congress instructed the CFTC to regulate
according to principles, rather than rules, and to leave the OTC
derivatives market alone. The goal of financial innovation trumped the
goal of financial stability. Both the SEC and CFTC, directly, and
through their congressional oversight committees, have suffered from
regulatory capture by the securities industry. The mandates and
regulatory methodologies for these two agencies should be reconciled,
and both should be made more workable and freer from industry and
congressional interference. Although these agencies are "independent,"
neither is sufficiently large, well-funded, or protected by powerful
political forces-particularly after the financial crisis for which they are
being blamed-to operate as the expert regulators they were intended to
be. Further, the SEC needs new authority and greater funding to
regulate important unregulated sectors of the securities markets, such as
credit derivatives and hedge funds. 36 Regulation of other sectors, such
as credit rating agencies (CRAs) and investment advisors, needs to be
substantially strengthened. Furthermore, exemptions for so-called
sophisticated investors have proven chimerical and need to be
reexamined.37  These regulatory areas, however, impact market
regulation only indirectly, and are beyond the scope of this Article.
In healthy economic times, there has been a tension between Wall
Street and Main Street-that is between finance and industry-which is
a good check and balance in a capitalist system. Since the 1980s,
regulators have permitted and even encouraged financial interests to
overwhelm industry's needs. Market or trading interests, rather than
capital formation and investor protection, became the focus of financial
regulators. While the genie unleashed by derivatives trading cannot be
put back into a magic lamp, the leverage injected into the financial
markets by derivatives needs to be seriously and permanently reduced,
not merely constrained until the next financial bubble. A significant
goal of the Exchange Act was reducing and controlling securities credit,
but financial regulators forgot the importance of limiting such credit.
Further, the SEC of the future, whatever its amended organization,
statutory authority, and mandates, should refocus on capital formation in
the stock and bond markets and protecting investors' retirement savings.
36. See Joanna Chung, Schumer seeks SECfunding reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at 4.
37. See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited
Investor, 39 RUTGERS L. J. 681, 681-86 (2008).
2009]
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II. JURISDICTIONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE SEC
AND CFTC
A. Regulatory Histories
The separate regulatory histories and philosophies of the SEC and the
CFTC have been detailed by others and are only summarized here.38
The SEC is a full disclosure agency and has relied upon Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5, as well as antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange
Act, to police the markets, including insider trading practices. 39  The
CFTC does not have comparable authority with regard to insider trading.
While the SEC has relied on suitability requirements and insurance of
cash and securities in broker-dealer customer accounts, the CFTC does
not have similar regulations. 40 The margin rules for trading in securities
and commodities are different.4' Until recently, the SEC had short
selling rules to control market volatility, whereas the CFTC had price
and position limits.
42
The CFTC has relied on policing exchange markets and a statute,
which until 2000, forced virtually all commodities futures trading on to
exchange markets to control fraud and manipulation. The SEC, by
contrast, was charged by the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act
with integrating exchange and OTC markets, as well as injecting
competition between markets into securities trading.43 In the face of a
recalcitrant industry, in order to accomplish these goals, the SEC
engaged in detailed rulemaking. 44 Since the mid-1970s, the securities
markets have undergone vast changes, and although the goals of the
national market system are not irrelevant, competition between the SEC
and the CFTC, a deregulatory mood in Washington, and competition
with foreign markets (especially London), have weakened the SEC's
authority. The NYSE has merged with Euronext 45 and does little floor
trading, Nasdaq has become an entirely electronic national securities
38. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
319, 341-56 (2003); Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 23, at 1444-50.
39. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 23, at 1492-94.
40. Markham, supra note 38, at 344-45.
41. Id. at 369 n.257; Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 23, at 1494-95.
42. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACK, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON
CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES 14-18 (1987).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-I (2006).
44. See generally Junius W. Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 301 (2007).
45. NYSE Euronext Form 10-K, For the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2008, at ii.
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exchange,46 and the issue confronting regulators is whether trading in
unregulated markets (dark pools) should be more transparent.47 In short,
what is needed is a new look at old problems, but it is questionable
whether the Exchange Act's national market provisions give the SEC the
mandate or the authority to deal with today's global trading markets.
Securities trading exists to assist capital formation. Commodities
trading is designed to enhance price discovery and spread risk. The
primary goal of the SEC is investor protection, while the CFTC oversees
the hedging of risk, which necessarily encourages speculation.48
Whether the mandates and regulatory philosophies of the SEC and the
CFTC can be successfully melded is a difficult question. But by
allowing the CFTC to regulate derivatives on securities as commodity
futures, and exempting OTC derivatives from any regulation, Congress
undermined the SEC's ability of to function effectively as a market
regulator, particularly with regard to securities credit, short selling and
broker-dealer capital adequacy regulation.
The Blueprint argued that the CFTC's regulatory philosophy was
superior to the SEC's regulatory approach because the CFTC based its
regulation on principles, whereas the SEC based its regulation on rules.
Similar claims have been made about the principles-based approach of
the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom as compared to
the SEC's rules-based approach. But this dichotomy between principles
and rules is not supportable by the way in which regulators conduct
themselves. 49 Although the SEC's net capital rules, margin rules, and
short sale rules are rules, they are supplemented by broad principles of
general applicability. 50 Further, the SEC's antifraud and antimarket
manipulation rules are principles-based, but may "morph into multi-
factor tests," which function as rules, where rulemaking is delegated to
SROs. 51 In criticizing the SEC for rule-based regulation, the Blueprint
46. In the matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a
National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006).
47. See generally Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S.
Stock Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273 (2007). See also Jeremy Grant, Exchanges body
issues 'dark pools' warning, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at 6; Scott Patterson, Kara Scannell & Geoffrey
Rogow, Ban on Flash Orders Is Considered by SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at CI, C3.
48. Although there can be hedgers on both sides of a commodities futures contract, generally one
side is a hedger and the other side is a speculator. This is not inherently bad because it aids price
discovery for agricultural commodities. But in the financial futures arena, it inevitably leads to
speculation, which can become destructive.
49. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
"Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REv. 1411, 1492 (2007).
50. Id. at 1447-49.
51. Id. at 1451.
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and others may be asking for approaches more sympathetic to the
industry. 52 According to the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA), a principles-based approach to regulation is not a
substitute for "clear and . . . prescriptive rules. Broadly framed
standards of conduct can serve as helpful guides for industry as well as
useful enforcement tools for regulators, but standing alone, they leave
too much room for abuse. 53
B. Jurisdictional Conflicts
The SEC objected when the CFTC approved Ginnie Mae futures, and
then in 1978, unsuccessfully requested that Congress give it jurisdiction
over all derivative products relating to underlying instruments that were
securities.54 Six years after the CBOT began trading in Ginnie Mae
futures, the SEC approved trading in Ginnie Mae options by the CBOE.
The CBOT successfully sued the SEC, claiming that the CFTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over these options because they were futures
contracts rather than securities. 55 To alleviate the rivalry between the
two agencies, CFTC Chair Phillip Johnson and SEC Chair John Shad
negotiated an accord in 1982 purporting to settle the jurisdictional
differences between the agencies.56 This agreement provided that the
CFTC was to have exclusive jurisdiction over all futures contracts,
options on futures, stock index futures and options on stock index
futures, while the SEC was to have jurisdiction over options on
securities and options on stock indexes. Subsequently, Congress gave a
statutory imprimatur to this accord.57
A myriad of studies conducted after the 1987 stock market crash
concluded that futures and securities had become one market, and prices
during the market downdraft in October 1987 were set by the futures
52. The CFTC is run by economists, rather than lawyers, who tend to defer to the exchanges.
Markham, supra note 38, at 360.
53. Press Release, North American Securities Administrators Association, NASAA Outlines
Core Principles for Regulatory Reform in Financial Services (Nov. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/NASAANewsroom/CurrentNASAAHeadlines/9781 .cfm#.
54. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational
Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447,461 (1995).
55. Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1155-59 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982).
56. SEC and CFTC, Joint Explanatory Statement, [1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982); see William J. Brodsky, New Legislation Permitting Stock Futures: The
Long and Winding Road, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 573, 574-75 (2001).
57. Act of Jan. 11, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 & 15 U.S.C.); Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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markets. 58  The SEC charged that futures trading had disrupted the
setting of prices by stock exchanges, thereby threatening their future,
and asked Congress to transfer jurisdiction over futures on stock indexes
from the CFTC to the SEC.59 Not only did the SEC lose this battle, but
in 1989, it lost another case in the Seventh Circuit in which the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) and CBOT challenged the SEC's approval
of index participations by the Philadelphia and American stock
exchanges.6°
At this point, the SEC aggressively fought to merge the SEC and the
CFTC, but the CFTC defended its existence. 61 A replay of this turf war
occurred in the early 1990s when the CME proposed that the CFTC and
the SEC be consolidated into a super-regulator with various banking
agencies. 62 In all of the jurisdictional battles between the SEC and the
CFTC, the Federal Reserve Board was an active player, garnering power
to itself, and, just as the SEC and CFTC were protecting their regulated
industries, the Federal Reserve Board was looking out for the interests of
the banks over which it had authority. 63 This three-way rivalry came to
a head in the CFMA,64 which permitted commodities exchanges to trade
single stock futures. Further, to the extent that the SEC and CFTC
disagreed upon the margin requirements for a single stock future, the
Federal Reserve Board was designated as a mediator and arbitrator.
65
Unfortunately, the CFMA legislated that the trading of OTC financial
derivatives between sophisticated counterparties should be excluded
from regulation by the CFTC, the SEC or anyone else.66 The CFMA
justified this on the ground that most OTC financial derivatives were not
susceptible to manipulation. Accordingly, the CFMA excluded the OTC
derivatives markets from commodities regulation, including the
antifraud provisions.67 Because by definition these instruments were
commodities futures contracts, they were not regulated as securities
either.
58. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Rashomon Effect in After-the-Crash Studies, 12 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES. REG. 101, 103-04 (1988).
59. Coffee, supra note 54, at 462.
60. Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 548-50 (7th Cit. 1989).
61. See John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36
VILL. L.REV. 1175,1189(1991).
62. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 449.
63. Id. at 460.
64. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12,& 15 U.S.C.).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(2)(B) (2006).
66. See id. §§ 78c(a)(1 1), (55), (56).
67. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 47.
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In the past, the CFTC resisted consolidation with the SEC because it
believed it would be submerged into a larger, more respected agency.
68
Currently, it is the SEC that may fear consolidation, in view of the
criticisms leveled at the agency in the Blueprint as being too stringent in
its regulatory rulemaking compared to the CFTC, and later, criticisms by
congressmen and other critics, as being too lax in its regulatory and
enforcement programs during the Bush Administration. 69  However
blameworthy the SEC may be, much more blame for the financial
meltdown belongs to the Federal Reserve Board for embracing
derivatives, and to Congress, which was too responsive to special
interests and campaign contributions from Wall Street and La Salle
Street, and indifferent to the interests of Main Street and public
investors.
The Obama Administration has tasked the SEC and the CFTC with
recommending statutory and regulatory changes to Congress that would
harmonize the regulation of futures and securities. As a first effort, the
agencies are to identify to Congress "all existing conflicts in statutes and
regulations with respect to similar types of financial instruments and
either explain[] why those differences are essential to achieve
underlying policy objectives with respect to investor protection, market
integrity, and price transparency or make[] recommendations ...that
would eliminate the differences.,, 70 To that end, the two agencies held
joint hearings in September 2009 to assess their current regulatory
schemes, with a view to harmonization. The hearings covered a
daunting array of issues, including several which involve market
regulation directly, including clearance and settlement, margin
requirements, and enforcement policies. It is unlikely that the SEC and
the CFTC will be able to harmonize their regulations in these areas.
In the report of the SEC and the CFTC on harmonization, issued after
these hearings, the two agencies recommended that legislation should
provide a process for expedited judicial review of judicial matters
regarding new products. 7' They stated they would support legislation
that allowed the CFTC to exercise jurisdiction over an instrument that
the SEC exempts and clarified that the SEC could exercise authority
68. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 451.
69. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2008, at Al; Michael Cooper, McCain Says S.E.C. Chairman Should Be Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2008, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/1 8/mccain-says-sec-chairman-should-be-fired/?dbk;
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Lessons ofMadoff NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 2009, at 12.
70. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 50-51; See also Joint Meetings on
Harmonization of Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 60539, 2009 WL 2595551 (Aug. 19, 1009).
71. CFTC and SEC, A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation
87 (Oct. 16, 2009) ([hereinafter Joint Report]).
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over a securities-related products that the CFTC has exempted. Further,
there should be a time line for the two agencies either to use their
exemptive authority or to come to an agreement on the status of any new
product.72 The Joint Report by the SEC and the CFTC demonstrates
important conflicts between their statutory mandates. Although the
report contains many helpful ideas for bridging those gaps, such as the
creation of joint advisory committees to develop solutions to emerging
and ongoing issues, a joint agency enforcement task force, a cross
agency training program, and a joint information technology task
force,73 the Joint Report also demonstates the difficulty of reconciling
their statutory mandates. In areas such as margin requirements, clearing,
and the prohibition of manipulation, insider trading, and fraud, the
agencies have very different approaches. Further, the failure of the
Administration to recommend merger of these agencies is a lost
opportunity for sensible and necessary regulatory reform.
The Administration's proposed Over-the Counter Derivatives Markets
Act of 2009, 74 however, which would govern the swaps market, would
harmonize some regulations and implement mechanisms for the
Department of the Treasury to settle certain disputes between the SEC
and the CFTC.
III. POLITICAL FORCES KEEPING THE SEC AND CFTC SEPARATE AND
ENCOURAGING DERIVATIVES TRADING
When the political winds in Washington favored deregulation, some
academics advocated competition between regulatory agencies as a
method for reaching an appropriate regulatory result. Analogies were
made to market competition as the route to optimum regulation and an
avenue for encouraging creativity in the financial markets.7 5 Others,
including me, were not convinced that encouraging competition among
regulators was a good idea, arguing that it leads to a race to the bottom,
and that it is unseemly when government agencies fight one another in
72. Id. at 88.
73. Id. at 93-94.
74. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Over-the-Counter Derivative Markets Act of 2009,
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Over-the-Counter Derivative Markets Act], H.R. 3795, 111 th Cong. (2009).
75. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 916-18 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing
Toward the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1811-17 (2002); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2392-95 (1998).
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court, directly or by proxy. 76  Regulatory competition, as seen in the
battles between the SEC and the CFTC, has proven extremely
unproductive and resulted in widespread use of unregulated OTC
derivatives by financial institutions-a key cause of the current financial
meltdown.
Why has this rivalry between two similar agencies persisted for so
long, and who has benefited? The simple answer is that congressmen
seeking campaign finance funds from the securities and commodities
industries have benefited from the constant warfare between these
agencies, along with the periodic fights over CFTC reauthorization. 7
The House and Senate agriculture committee members who had
oversight over the commodities industry received huge campaign
contributions from that sector, and of course, were reluctant to relinquish
their power to other committees. 78 Similarly, members of the House and
Senate banking and securities oversight committees enjoyed donations
from Wall Street. 79  There was a geographical, as well as a power
politics dimension to these battles. The commodity futures industry is
based in Chicago; the securities industry in New York. The Seventh
Circuit in Chicago played a role in helping the CBOT and CME win
battles against the SEC. Large, agricultural interest groups repeatedly
trumped financial interest groups, just as they have trumped urban
interests in other political battles.80  Although the securities and
76. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Working Group Report, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1988, at 3; Frank
Partnoy, Multinational Competition and Single- Stock Futures, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 641, 644-45
(2001); Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That Should Be)
Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1177-79 (2005).
77. The CFTC was (until 2000) subject to reauthorization by Congress every two years. See
Mark Frederick Hoffman, Note, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 681, 687 (1995). These reauthorization proceedings were costly and time consuming and
made the CFTC vulnerable to political pressure and capture. Id. at 708; Jerry W. Markham, The
Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 1004-12 (1991);
Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279,
353-61, 363-68 (1997).
78. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments. Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv. 987, 1021-22 (1992). At the time of the 1987 stock market crash, the CME had one of the three or
four biggest political action committees in the country. MARTIN MAYER, MARKETS: WHO PLAYS, WHO
RISKS, WHO LOSES 129 (1988).
79. See Eric Lipton & Raymond Hernandez, A Champion of Wall Street Reaps the Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at AI; SIA Leads in Handing Money Over to Congress, WALL ST. LETTER, Aug.
22, 1988, at 2.
80. On March 27, 1990, eighteen agricultural associations jointly sent a letter to Senator Leahy,
Chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, stating they believed it was
necessary to maintain an independent CFTC because a merged agency would be overshadowed by
securities interests. At this time, Wendy Gramm was Chair of the CFTC, and in a Senate hearing stated
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commodities industries encouraged rivalry between the SEC and the
CFTC, it is ironic that many of the players in those industries were part
of the same financial conglomerates. But bifurcated regulation of the
trading markets was necessarily weaker regulation, especially when the
financial industry could claim that there was also regulatory competition
with foreign regulators.
A more complicated answer to the continued fractious fighting
between the SEC and the CFTC would include Alan Greenspan as a
culprit because he was a consistent cheerleader for financial derivatives;
he did not believe in curbing securities credit, and did not see it in the
interest of the Federal Reserve Board to resolve the controversies
between the SEC and CFTC by creating a more powerful combined
market regulator. The Obama Treasury Department similarly has
preferred to aggrandize its own power over a merged SEC and CFTC. 81
When the federal securities laws were passed in the 1930s, Congress
seriously considered how unregulated securities credit had fueled the
1920s bull market and led to the 1929 crash. The federal margin rules
were promulgated to prevent any such future debacles, but the margin
rules have long been ignored. A fundamental premise of the federal
securities laws was that the stock market and securities industry
intermediaries need to be regulated to protect the national banking
system and the Federal Reserve System.82 In 1934, Congress was
concerned about stock market speculation caused by undue securities
credit, 83 believing that trading securities on credit could lead to
significant problems in the national economy and the financial markets
because credit-financed securities speculation diverted resources from
more productive uses in commerce, industry, and agriculture. 8  Such
activities created or reinforced stock market bubbles, and led many
people "perhaps drawn in by the exuberance of the market" to assume
the SEC would be a "hostile regulator" over stock index futures. Because Wendy Gramm was the wife
of Phil Gramm, the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee with oversight over the SEC, her words had
a certain (questionable) weight. See Hazen, supra note 78, at 1022 n.195.
81. Under Section 711 of the proposed Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act of 2009, if the
CFTC and the SEC cannot agree on a rule required under the law, the Department of the Treasury is
given the authority to make rules and impose them on both agencies. Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 11 1th Cong. § 111 (2009) (ordered to be reported by the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs.).
82. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 4-6 (1984) (asserting that uncontrolled trading of securities on
credit was a major cause of the Stock Market Crash of 1929); see also Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law
Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J.
701, 728-33 (1999) (detailing the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act).
84. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL
MARGIN REGULATIONS 3 (1984) [hereinafter MARGIN STUDY].
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securities positions of undue risk.85
Among the tools Congress gave the SEC to deal with speculation
were provisions regarding margin lending. The margin requirements,
set forth in Section 7 of the Exchange Act, were designed to prevent the
"excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities." 86
The Federal Reserve Board was given responsibility to prescribe
regulations with respect to the amount of securities credit that could be
extended and maintained by financial institutions, in an amount not
greater than either 55% of the current market price of the security or
100% of the lowest market price during the preceding 36 calendar
months, but not more than 75% of the current market price. 87 The SEC
was then given the responsibility for enforcing the margin regulations
against broker-dealers.
Between 1936 and 1974, the Federal Reserve Board changed margin
ratios twenty-five times, with levels ranging from a low of 40% in the
late 1930s to a high of 100% just after World War II, but generally kept
ratios between 50 and 70%.88 In 1974, the Federal Reserve Board set
margin rates at 50% and has not changed them since. 89 During and after
the bull market of the late 1960s when margin rates were high, the
margin regulations were taken so seriously that the SEC sanctioned
broker-dealers that violated the margin rules,90 and the Department of
Justice criminally prosecuted banks and others for violations. 9' Further,
margin violations were actionable in private lawsuits. 92  In 1984,
however, the Federal Reserve Board recommended that margin
regulation be abolished for two reasons. First, the primary purpose of
such regulation should be to ensure the integrity of the marketplace by
seeing that there is protection against significant credit loss for brokers,
banks, and other lenders. Second, stock-based futures and options
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (2006).
87. Id. Regulation T, applicable to broker-dealers, is 12 C.F.R. § 220.12 (2009).
88. MARGIN STUDY, supra note 84, at 48; see Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities and
Commodities Law (CBC) § 8:3 n.5 (2009).
89. Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 798 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 1, 11-15 (1963).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commerciale E dD'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp.
1384, 1387-89 (S.D.N.Y 1971); United States v. Whorl, SEC Litigation Release No. 4478 (Nov. 24,
1969).
92. See, e.g., Junger v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1970);
Newman v. Pershing & Co., 412 F. Supp. 463, 466-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-17 (D. Mass. 1949). This principle was later abandoned. See Bennett v. U.S.
Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 310-13 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding no civil action available under § 7,
irrespective of whether the case arises under Regulation U or T).
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contracts had become close substitutes for margin leverage and
therefore, if the margin regulations were to be maintained, margins in
the derivatives markets needed to be significantly raised. This task
should be done either by self-regulatory organizations or an interagency
task force involving the SEC and the CFTC.93 Thereafter, despite
evidence of speculation and volatility in the stock market in the middle
and late 1980s, the late 1990s, and more recently, Congress did nothing
with this recommendation and the Federal Reserve Board did nothing
about margin rates. In view of widespread leverage accomplished
through derivatives trading, raising margin rates might have been a futile
gesture, but at least it would have been a warning about undue
speculation and leverage in the securities markets. Moreover, excessive
securities credit could have been curbed through better regulation of
derivatives.
The 1987 stock market crash was a warning about the danger of
uncontrolled speculation and leverage in the derivatives markets, but the
Federal Reserve Board and other regulators took no action. The 508-
point drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages on Monday, October
19, 1987 on a record high volume of over 600 million shares was an
even steeper decline in stock prices than Black Thursday of October 29,
1929. The New York Stock Exchange nearly closed on Tuesday,
October 20, 1987, and probably would have, but for the Federal Reserve
Board's intervention and the seemingly miraculous rebound in the
market at midday. 94
The culprit of market volatility most immediately identified after the
crash was "program trading." This inexact term covered a variety of
computer assisted trading strategies involving derivative products,
particularly stock index futures. All of these strategies involved efforts
to hedge against stock market risk, but functioned during the crash to
increase a market decline. 95
Numerous studies conducted after the crash by government and
exchange bodies 96 agreed upon little other than that the prices of stocks
93. See Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, to the Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman, S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry,
(Jan. 11, 1985).
94. See James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Terrible Tuesday: How the Stock Market Almost
DisintegratedA Day After the Crash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1987, at Al.
95. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the Effects of
Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 799-802
(1987).
96. After various exchanges issued reports, a blue ribbon Presidential Committee headed by
Nicholas Brady published its report. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS (1988). The SEC issued a staff report, as did the CFTC. See DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988); Div. OF ECON. ANALYSIS &
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during the crash were being established by the derivatives markets in
Chicago instead of by the stock exchanges in New York and elsewhere.
A presidential committee recommended that one government agency
regulate intermarket issues, and suggested the Federal Reserve Board,
but Alan Greenspan declined this responsibility. 97 After these reports
were issued, the President appointed a Working Group on Financial
Markets comprised of the Chairs of the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve
Board, and Secretary of the Treasury (President's Working Group); it
was to agree on intermarket mechanisms to prevent another crash within
sixty days.98 The President's Working Group, however, was unable to
agree to raising margin rates or otherwise address stock market
leverage. 
99
The collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was
another warning sign of excessive securities credit and poor OTC
derivatives' regulation. LTCM was an investment vehicle for a number
of hedge funds. It began with a capital base of $5 billion and its
principals included a former vice-chair and bond trading chief at
Salomon Brothers, Inc. and two Nobel laureates in economics. 100 Its
portfolio was extraordinarily large and risky. Approximately 80% of
LTCM's balance-sheet positions were in treasury securities of the major
industrial countries and this portfolio, as of the end of 1997, was
leveraged 28-to-1. But its off-balance-sheet activities and use of
derivatives made its activities more leveraged and risky. By August
1998, LTCM had approximately $1.4 trillion in notional value of
derivatives off-balance sheet on a capital base of approximately $2.3
billion. When Russia devalued the ruble and declared a debt
moratorium in August 1998, LTCM became highly vulnerable to the
market conditions that ensued and by September had lost almost 50% of
its equity. The Federal Reserve Board was required to intervene because
of the systemic threat that LTCM's collapse would have posed to the
capital markets. Although the Federal Reserve Board did not lend
money to LTCM itself, it facilitated a private sector recapitalization of
Div. OF TRADING AND MKTS,, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT ON STOCK
INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITIES DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1987).
97. "Black Monday, " The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987: Hearings before S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 98-99 (1988) (testimony of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Govemors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
98. White House Issues Order Creating Working Group on Financial Markets, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 452 (Mar. 25, 1988); Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
99. SEC Chairman David Ruder dissented from the Report on this ground.
100. Paul N. Roth & Brian H. Fortune, Hedge Fund Regulation in the Aftermath of Long-Term
Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION 83 (lain Cullen & Helen Parry eds.,
2001).
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LTCM composed of fourteen banks and securities firms, which were
LTCM's largest creditors. 1
01
As was the case with the 1987 stock market crash, a number of
governmental, international, and private sector groups were convened to
study the financial crisis; several bills were introduced in Congress but
little happened. The general consensus of these various reports was that
LTCM's counterparties took undue risks and ignored their own credit
risk parameters, but that regulators should rely on transparency and
market forces to improve risk management by institutional investors.
Many reports noted the "regulatory gap" between the SEC and the
CFTC and paid homage to greater regulatory coordination,102 but did not
recommend regulating hedge funds. A President's Working Group
report specifically declined to recommend the direct regulation of
unregulated hedge funds or derivatives dealers on the grounds that
regulation would drive these entities offshore.'
03
Alan Greenspan, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
embraced derivatives because he believed they were good for banks
because they spread risk. 104 He argued that derivatives were essential to
the stability of the banking system and therefore should not be
regulated. 0 5  Further, Greenspan attributed the substantial increase in
U.S. wealth and productivity in part to the derivatives markets. 0 6 But
by keeping interest rates too low, the Federal Reserve Board fueled a
stock market bubble and then a credit bubble. 0 7  Further, derivatives
trading completely undermined the SEC's short sale rule and the margin
regulations. Blaming the Federal Reserve Board is no more useful than
blaming the SEC for the meltdown in the financial markets, but it is
troubling that many recommendations for regulatory reform involve
giving the Federal Reserve Board more power and responsibility than it
has now. 0 8  By refusing to regulate securities credit, and keeping
101. Id. at 85-87.
102. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED
TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 24 (1999).
103. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 32-41 (1999).
104. David Blake, Greenspan 's sins return to haunt us, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at 17.
105. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1019,1023-24 (2007).
106. Kai Kramer, Comment, Aren 't We Still in the "Garden of the Forking Paths"? A Comment
on Consolidation of the SEC and CFTC, 4 Hous. BUS. & TAX L.J. 410, 417 (2004).
107. See Greg lp, In Treating U.S. After Bubble, Fed Helped Create New Threats, WALL ST. J.,
June 9, 2005, at Al.
108. One critic, noting that the Federal Reserve Board has not taken as much heat from Congress
as the SEC, quipped that "[slometimes nothing succeeds like failure." Floyd Norris, Failing Upward at
the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at BI, B4; see also Allan H. Meltzer, Keep the Fed Away From the
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interest rates too low, the Federal Reserve Board was as complicit in
encouraging such risks as was either the SEC or CFTC. Further,
Congress and the Executive were more complicit by bowing to the
political winds urging deregulation of financial services.
IV. THE SEC AS A PRUDENTIAL AND MARKET REGULATOR
A. Broker-Dealer Capital Adequacy
The SEC's mandate has never been to prevent the stock market from
falling, and in the past, no broker-dealer was considered too big to fail.
If an investment bank mismanaged its business, it was forced into
bankruptcy. The securities laws were designed only to protect customer
funds and fully paid for securities held by brokers as custodians. Yet,
broker-dealers were required by the Exchange Act, to maintain a certain
level of capital adequacy as a cushion against financial failure.
In 1975, the SEC became responsible for administering the net capital
rule for all broker-dealers. 10 9  Generally, this rule required broker-
dealers to maintain a debt-to-net capital ratio of 15-to-1.11 0 But this rule
did not apply to the parent of a broker-dealer or to sister subsidiaries. In
April 2004, SEC Chair William Donaldson and SEC commissioners
undertook the Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (CSE). The
background for this change was that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,"'
which eliminated the separation of investment and commercial banking,
made no provision for regulating broker-dealer holding companies
similar to the Federal Reserve Board's supervision of bank holding
companies. 112  After the European Union threatened to become the
consolidated regulator of U.S. broker-dealer holding companies, the
SEC undertook this task, but on a voluntary basis. That is, the five
Investment Banks, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2008, at A17.
109. Prior to that time, the New York Stock Exchange administered the net capital rule for NYSE
member firms, but after the back office crisis and numerous bankruptcies of the late 1960s and early
1970s, and passage of the Securities Investor Protection Act, the stock exchanges no longer had
responsibility for formulating or enforcing this rule. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 458-60 (Houghton Mifflin 1982).
110. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-I(a) (2009) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(7) (2009) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2009). See also Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of
Broker-Dealers, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, at 1.
I ll. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12, 15, 16 U.S.C.).
112. But see Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101432, 104 Stat. 963 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. 78m, 78q (2006)) (passed after the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert,
requiring broker-dealers to file regulatory reports on their financing, capital risk management policies,
and pending legal proceedings).
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largest companies at the time agreed to have the SEC become their
supervisor, even though there was no statutory authority for such
regulation." 3 Under this regime, these firms were permitted to transfer
billions of dollars of reserves against capital to their parent holding
companies for investment in mortgage backed-securities, credit
derivatives, and other exotic instruments. 1 4  As a result, by the time
Bear Steams collapsed, the ratios of four of the five firms subject to the
consolidated regulation program was in the neighborhood of 30-to-i,
although none violated the net capital rule."l 5 SEC Chair Cox conceded
that the SEC's inadequate oversight of consolidated broker-dealers,
including Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers, contributed to the
financial crisis. 116 He also noted that the SEC's program of oversight
over broker-dealer holding companies was a voluntary program and
therefore was "fundamentally flawed from the beginning." ' 1 7  But the
SEC's program was consistent with the supervision of bank capital
adequacy, which allowed banks to comply with internally generated risk
measurements. "1 
8
In 2008, the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury decided that the
option of bankruptcy for some large investment bank holding companies
was no longer good policy. If that is to remain the case, broker-dealer
holding companies should be regulated like other financial institutions
considered too big or too interconnected to fail, but this is essentially
utility regulation. Leverage and risk-taking will have to be severely
curtailed. This may be the proper regulation for commercial banks, but
it may not be the best long-term regulation for investment banks,
because they are supposed to act as underwriters of risk in the capital
formation process and as traders of securities in the secondary markets
for price discovery and liquidity objectives.
113. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored
Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2008), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=c17161 d3-a5f7-
4544-9ade-7dc2197ddce0 [hereinafter Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets] (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
114. Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008,
at Al.
115. Id. at A23.
116. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2008, at Al.
117. Id.
118. See Review of Investor Protection and Market Oversight with the Five Commissioners of the
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
S10th Cong. 79-80 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_house_hearings&docid=f:37560.pdf (statement of the U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
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Although there seems to be a growing consensus that systemic risk1 19
regulation should be assumed by either the Federal Reserve Board or a
new regulator, rearranging the regulatory chairs is not as important as
changing the substance of the net capital rule applicable to broker-
dealers. Risks to the whole enterprise, and not just risks to the broker-
dealer entity should be considered in any capital adequacy rules. Off-
balance-sheet accounting should not be permitted. Financial institutions
should not be allowed to establish their own risk standards and then
manage to those standards.
There remains a question as to whether a central banker should
assume the role of a systemic and prudential regulator for all large
financial institutions because of the serious conflicts of interest involved.
The Department of the Treasury is a political department of the
Executive Branch, and also the issuer of U.S. government debt. So the
question of how and by whom systemic and prudential regulation should
be crafted and administrated is not simple-especially if one believes, as
I do, that such regulation should be entrusted to an independent agency.
Regulators are reluctant to enforce capital adequacy rules against a
major financial institution or to close down any firm. Politicians are
even more reluctant. Only a strong, independent regulator stands any
chance of being firm enough to pierce a financial bubble before it
explodes.
There is support for a new systemic risk regulator for all large
financial institutions, and another (or the same) prudential regulator to
enforce risk regulations. One remaining question is whether or how new
regulations for hedge funds should be allocated between the SEC or
such a new regulator. Professor Coffee has suggested that a systemic
risk regulator should have the authority to: limit the leverage of financial
institutions and prescribe mandatory capital adequacy standards;
approve, restrict, and regulate trading in new financial products;
mandate clearing houses; mandate write downs for risky assets; and
intervene to prevent and avert liquidity crises. 120 But as he points out,
there are over 5,000 registered broker-dealers in the United States and it
would be infeasible for a systemic risk regulator to oversee all of
them. 121 It is unclear whether the SEC is capable of doing so,
particularly if hedge funds are added to the mix of intermediaries
119. Systemic risk is risk to an entire financial system or market, as opposed to the collapse of one
firm within that market. Kathleen A. Scott, Addressing the Conditions Leading to 'System Risk' on a
Global Basis, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2009, at 3.
120. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Systematic Risk Regulator? Who, What and Why?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 19,
2009, at 5.
121. Id.
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already subject to SEC surveillance. Professors Coffee, Sale, and Fisch
have argued that the SEC did not do an adequate job of prudential or
systemic regulation with regard to the CSE program, and that the SEC
may not be capable of such a role. 122
Because there is little consensus as to whether any existing regulatory
agencies have shown sufficient expertise and backbone to curtail
systemic risk, one idea gaining traction is a council of existing regulators
to oversee risk in the financial markets. SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair have both endorsed such an idea. 12 3 The Obama
Administration also has proposed such a council, dubbed the Financial
Services Oversight Council, but as an agency to complement the Federal
Reserve Board acting as a systemic regulator. 124 This proposal has since
been adopted by the House Committee on Financial Services. 125 At first
blush this seems to be a warmed over and expanded version of the
President's Working Group, formed after the 1987 stock market crash,
which has accomplished little. But in this new and different political
climate, such a council might be more activist.
B. Credit Derivatives
Credit default swaps are a financial contract with a value based on
underlying debt obligations. They transfer risk rather than raise capital.
A credit default swap can be tied to the performance of the debt
obligations of a single issuer, or an index of multiple issuers. 126 These
are generally structured as OTC derivative contracts so that they will be
subject to the "swap exclusion" from the definition of "securities" under
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and therefore not subject to
SEC regulation.127 Further, when Brooksley Born was CFTC Chair and
tried to regulate credit default swaps, Alan Greenspan and then-Treasury
122. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV.707 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95
VA. L. REv. 785 (2009).
123. See Andrew Ackerman, A Council of Regulators, THE BOND BUYER, May 11, 2009. The
Treasury Department has proposed a new, independent, systemic regulator. Press Release, Department
of the Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html.
124. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 20.
125. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).
126. Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearings Before the
H. Comm. on Agric., 110th Cong. 14, available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/I 10/1 10-49.pdf
[hereinafter Role of Credit Derivatives] (prepared statement of Erik Sirri, Director, Div.of Trading and
Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
127. Id. at 17; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15, 16 U.S.C.).
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Secretary Robert Rubin blocked such regulation on the ground that it
would precipitate a financial crisis. 128  Congress then exempted OTC
derivatives from CFTC regulation. 1
29
Credit derivatives operate functionally as short sales of bonds with
virtually unlimited risks. 130 This is because the buyer of a credit default
swap does not have to own the bond or any other debt instrument upon
which such a contract is based. So buyers can purchase a "naked short"
on the debt of companies without any restrictions.' 31 Warren Buffet has
called derivatives "financial weapons of mass destruction"' 132  and
George Soros has contended that new derivatives should be regulated
like initial public offerings. 133  The head of the New York State
Insurance Department called credit derivatives "legalized gambling."1 34
As outgoing Chair of the SEC, Christopher Cox recommended that they
brought under immediate regulatory control. 135 The current SEC Chair,
Mary Schapiro, has similarly argued for their regulation. 136  In addition
to the role of credit derivatives in bringing down Bear Steams, Lehman
Bros., and other investment banks,1 37 the rescue of AIG, the world's
largest insurance company, cost the U.S. taxpayer $150 billion because
of AIG's holdings of credit derivatives.' 38
128. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM 14(2009).
Afterwards, she continued to warn about the danger of derivatives trading. See Brooksley Born,
International Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 607, 636-37 (2001); see also Richard B. Schmitt, The
Born Prophecy, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 50.
129. Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 27-27f (2006)).
130. George Soros, The game changer, FT.COM, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09b68a14-eda7-1 1 dd-bd60-0000779fd2ac.html.
131. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 113, at 7 (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
132. Warren Buffet, Chairman's Letter, in BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT
15 (2002), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf, see also Darrell Duffle,
Derivatives and Mass Financial Destruction, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at A17.
133. Soros, supra note 130.
134. See Shannon D. Harrington, DTCC May Raise Credit-Default Swap Disclosure Amid
Criticism, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 31, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a1 IF5ibQBk9w&refer--home.
135. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 113, at 7 (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
136. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to Practising Law Institute's
"SEC Speaks in 2009" Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO2O6O9mls.htm.
137. See Kara Scannell, SEC Faulted for Missing Red Flags at Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2008, at A3.
138. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Remake of A.LG. Is the Goal of Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2009, at BI; Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Case For a Giant, By a Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2009, at BI.
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Some believe that credit default swaps should be regulated as
commodities futures and forced on to commodities exchanges. Others
believe that credit default swaps should be forced into centralized
clearinghouses. 39  If such swaps become standardized, however, they
would lose their exemption from CFTC and SEC regulation.
140
Accordingly, the international SRO for swaps in the derivatives market
has long fought against their standardization and regulation. 141
Whether regulation of credit default swaps is given to the SEC or the
CFTC, or a combined agency, their future regulation appears inevitable.
The question is whether this regulation should take the form of
mandating transparency, compelling clearing through a recognized
clearing agency, or allowing only certain approved instruments to be
floated. Commodity exchanges could be given a monopoly on trading
credit default swaps if they become regulated as standardized
commodities. Before 2000, the CFTC would not have been able to
approve such trading until these instruments were tested for their
intrinsic merit and shown that they had an economic purpose and not be
contrary to the public interest. 142 But this requirement was gutted by the
CFMA and replaced by a SRO self-certification.1 43  Strengthened
regulation of OTC derivatives could reinstate such an economic merit
test. Some have suggested that the SEC be given powers similar to the
Food & Drug Administration to rule on the safety and soundness of new
derivative products, but it is unclear whether legislators will endorse
such an approach. 144 Merging the SEC and CFTC would simplify
crafting legislation appropriate for dealing with trading approvals for
credit default swaps and similar products.
In May 2009, Secretary Geithner asked Congress to approve
legislation that would impose new regulatory requirements on the OTC
derivatives market, which would permit both the SEC and the CFTC to
oversee and regulate these financial instruments. 145 The SEC and the
139. See, e.g., Schapiro, note 136; Duffie, supra note 132. The Obama Administration has
proposed that swaps and other derivatives be traded on exchanges or clearinghouses backed by capital
reserves. See Stephen Labaton & Jackie Calmes, Obama Proposes a First Overhaul of Finance Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14,2009, at Al.
140. Role of Credit Derivatives, supra note 126, at 12 (statement of Erik R. Sirri, Director, Div. of
Trading and Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
141. See Hearing to Review Derivatives Legislation: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric.,
111 th Cong. 141-43 (2009) (statement of Robert G. Pickel, Exec. Dir. & CEO, Int'l Swaps and
Derivatives Ass'n).
142. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 23 at 1448, 1448 n.51.
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 40.2 (2009); see also James M. Falvey & Andrew N. Klcit, Commodity
Exchanges and Antitrust, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 123, 166-67 (2007).
144. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 108.
145. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Regulatory Reform of Over-The-Counter (OTC)
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CFTC joined Secretary Geithner at the press conference and expressed
pleasure with his proposal. 146  But the proposal resolves the
jurisdictional tensions between these two agencies to only a limited
extent. This press conference was followed by the release of the
proposed Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act of 2009.147 This
proposed legislation would provide for regulation and transparency of
all OTC derivative transactions; strong prudential and business conduct
regulation of all OTC derivative dealers and other major participants in
the OTC derivative markets; and improved regulatory and enforcement
tools to prevent manipulation, fraud, and other abuses in those markets.
To reduce the risks to the financial stability that arises from the web
of bilateral connections among major financial institutions, the
legislation would require standardized OTC derivatives to be centrally
cleared by a derivatives clearing organization regulated by the CFTC or
a securities clearing agency regulated by the SEC.148 This proposal has
been adopted with changes by the House Financial Services
Committee.149 Under this proposal, the SEC will monitor swap activity
and transaction data and by rule or regulation identify specific swap
contracts that it determines are required to be cleared consistent with the
public interest, after taking into account several factors including the
existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity,
and adequate pricing data. 150 The legislation would require standardized
OTC derivatives to be traded on a swap execution facility registered
with the SEC, or a CFTC in case of contract of sale of a commodity for
future delivery or commodity option. 51  It would encourage
substantially greater use of standardized derivatives and thereby
facilitate migration of OTC derivatives onto central clearinghouses and
exchanges by imposing higher capital requirements 52 and higher
margin requirements for nonstandardized derivatives. 153 The legislation
Derivatives (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg129.htm,
146. Statement, Michael Dunn, Acting Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Joint
Press Conference on OTC Derivatives Regulation (May 13, 2009), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@newsroom/ documents/pressrelease/
dunnstatement051309.pdf, Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at
Treasury Department Press Briefing on OTC Derivatives (May 13, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch05I309mls.htm.
147. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act, supra note 81.
148. Id. § 713(a)(2).
149. H.R. 3795, 111 th Cong. (2009).
150. Id. §113(3).
151. Id. §113(6).
152. Id. § 117(e)(1)(B).
153. Id.
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proposes a broad definition of "derivative" and "swap." 154 All relevant
federal financial regulatory agencies would have access on a
confidential basis to the OTC derivative transactions and related open
positions of individual market participants.155 The public would have
access to aggregated data on open positions and trading volumes. 15
6
The legislation would require federal supervision and regulation of
any firm that deals in OTC derivatives and any other firm that takes
large positions in OTC derivatives. Federal banking agencies would
regulate OTC derivative dealers and major market participants that are
banks. 157 A federal banking agency may except an identified banking
product from the exclusion of application of Commodity Exchange Act
if the agency determines, in consultation with the CFTC and the SEC,
that the product would meet the definition of a security-based swap.15
8
OTC derivative dealers and major market participants that are not
banks would be regulated by the CFTC or SEC. 159 The federal banking
agencies, CFTC, and SEC would be required to provide robust and
comprehensive prudential supervision and regulation, including strict
capital and margin requirements, for all OTC derivative dealers and
major market participants. 160 The CFTC and SEC would be required to
issue and enforce strong business conduct, reporting, and recordkeeping
(including audit trail) rules161 for all OTC derivative dealers and major
market participants. 1
62
The legislation would give the CFTC and the SEC authority to deter
market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other abuses in the OTC
derivative markets. It would give the CFTC authority to set position
limits and large trader reporting requirements 163 for OTC derivatives
that perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect
to regulated markets. 164 The CFTC and the SEC would be required to
harmonize and jointly adopt uniform rules governing persons that are
registered as derivatives clearing organizations for swaps under the
proposed legislation' 65 and persons that are registered as clearing
154. Id. §111(a)(35).
155. Id. § 115 (c)(4).
156. Id. § 113 (2)(L).
157. Id. § 403(b).
158. Id.
159. Id. § l17(e)(1)(B).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 117(g)(4).
162. Id. § 117.
163. Id. § 153, § 10B(a).
164. Id. § 124(a)(2).
165. Id. § lll(c)(1).
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agencies for security-based swaps under the Exchange Act. If the CFTC
and the SEC fail to jointly prescribe uniform rules and regulations in a
timely manner, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
CFTC and the SEC, would prescribe rules and regulations within 180
days of the time that the CFTC and the SEC failed to adopt such rule
and regulation. 166  The legislation does not appear to sufficiently
eliminate the regulatory loopholes that allowed unregulated credit
derivatives to flourish. 1
67
C. Short Sales
Regulation of short sales is another politicized topic. A short sale is
the sale of any security the seller does not own or any sale consummated
by the delivery of a borrowed security. A former SEC rule prohibited
any person from effecting a short sale of any exchange listed security
below the price at which the last sale of that security was reported.
168
This was known as the "uptick" rule. It was rescinded in the summer of
2007 because the SEC believed it had become unnecessary with decimal
pricing and the transparency and surveillance in exchange markets. 169
Further, the widespread availability of options and derivatives had made
the rule of questionable utility because it could be so easily evaded by
trades in the futures markets. Nevertheless, after the current financial
crisis was triggered by the collapse of Bear Steams, and Lehman Bros.
began to fail, there was a hue and cry about short sellers and the SEC
responded by prohibiting short sales in financial stocks.
Between July 21 and August 15 the SEC restricted short sales in
nineteen financial stocks. 170 After this emergency order expired, turmoil
in the stock market continued, and financial firms claimed that their
stocks were being pounded by short sellers. The SEC then banned
"abusive naked short selling," or short selling by persons who do not
actually borrow stock to deliver against a sale, and fail to deliver stock
to the buyer. By a temporary rule, on September 17, 2008, the SEC
required short sellers and their broker-dealers to deliver securities by the
close of business on settlement date and imposed penalties for failure to
166. Id. § 111 (c)(2)
167. See Kara Scannell & Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Seeks More Credit-Swaps Power, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2009, at C3.
168. Former rule l0a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was adopted in 1938 to prevent
bear raids. Exchange Act Release No. 1,548, 3 Fed. Reg. 213 (Jan. 24, 1938).
169. Regulation SHO and Rule lOa-l, Exchange Act Release No. 55,970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348
(July 3, 2007).
170. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 93 SEC Docket 2122 (July 15, 2008);
see Mark Hulbert, Maybe Short-Selling Isn't So Bad, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at BU9.
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do SO.1 71 The SEC made this ban permanent in July 2009.172
In September 2008 the SEC banned short selling in the stocks of 799
U.S. financial sector companies, and later allowed the exchanges to add
additional companies to the list. 173 Nearly 1,000 stocks went on to this
list, including CVS Caremark Corp., International Business Machines
Corp., General Motors Corp., and General Electric Corp.'7 4  The SEC
also required hedge fund managers to disclose their short positions
publicly, and announced that this requirement would be made
permanent. 
75
The SEC's short selling bans have been criticized as making a volatile
market worse-a "clumsy effort to buoy shares of battered financial
stocks."' 176 It appears that the SEC's short sale bans cut the volume in
the stocks on the no-short-sale list, resulting in wide price swings.
Further, despite the bans, stocks including National City Corp. and
Sovereign Bancorp Inc. suffered sharp declines; Washington Mutual Inc.
and Wachovia Corp. essentially failed. 177  SEC Chair Cox later stated
that he thought the SEC's emergency short sale rules were a mistake. 1
78
Nevertheless, enormous political pressure was brought to bear on the
SEC to reinstate a short sale rule. 179  The SEC has proposed two
approaches to such a rule.' 80 One approach is to apply a price test on a
marketwide and permanent basis. This test would either be based on the
national best bid or the last sale price. The second approach is a circuit
breaker rule and would apply only to a particular security during a
severe price decline. It is questionable whether the SEC would reinstate
a short sale rule absent current political demands for such a rule,
18
171. 17 C.F.R. § 242.204T (2008); Emergency Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
58,572, 94 SEC Docket 293 (Sept. 17, 2008).
172. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266
(July 31, 2009).
173. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 94 SEC Docket 460 (Sept. 18, 2008);
Amendment to Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,611, 94 SEC Docket 501 (Sept. 21,
2008).
174. Kara Scannell & Serena Ng, SEC's Ban on Short Selling Is Casting a Very Wide Net, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at C1.
175. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,591, 94 SEC Docket 312 (Sept. 18, 2008).
176. Tom Lauricella et al., SEC Extends 'Short' Ban As Bailout Advances, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
2008, at C 1.
177. Id. at C7.
178. Rachelle Younglai, SEC chief has regrets over short-selling ban, REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2008.
179. Mary Schapiro, President Obama's appointee for Chairman of the SEC, represented in her
Senate confirmation hearing that she would quickly examine whether the uptick rule should be restored.
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Offers Plan for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3.
180. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,042
(proposed Apr. 20, 2009).
181. See id. at 18,046 nn.55-56.
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because the agency has stated that it believes short selling serves useful
market purposes. 182 In August 2009, the SEC proposed an alternative
uptick rule that would not require monitoring of the sequence of bids,
and as a result might be easier to monitor. 183
Railing against short sellers seems to be efforts to shoot the
messenger rather than listening to the message, but many observers
believe that abusive short selling drove down the prices of financial
stocks in the recent downturn. But the problem of leverage in the up
market which preceded the 2008 market collapse was a more serious
cause of the financial meltdown than elminating the uptick rule.
Further, there is no way to reinstate a meaningful uptick rule without
limiting derivatives on stocks. The AIG credit default swaps debacle
demonstrates that a short sale rule for bonds may also be justified if a
new short sale rule for stocks is promulgated.
D. Hedge Funds
Since hedge funds became participants in the securities markets in the
1950s, they have endeavored to operate as unregulated entities and the
SEC has been uncertain how, if at all, to regulate them. Most hedge
funds in the United States are formed as limited partnerships in order to
obtain flow-through tax treatment. Although most hedge funds and
private equity funds meet the definition of an investment company as
being "engaged primarily... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities," 184 they fall within exceptions to that definition
either because their securities are owned by not more than one hundred
persons, or their securities are owned "exclusively by persons who, at
the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers," and
they are not making or proposing to make a public offering of their
securities. 185
Similarly, the manager of a hedge fund or private equity fund falls
within the definition of an investment advisor as "any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly
or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to
the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.'
' 86
182. Id. at 18,044.
183. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,509, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,033
(proposed Aug. 20, 2009).
184. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2006).
185. Id, §§ 3(c)(1), (7)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(7)(A) (2006). For this purpose, a "[q]ualified
purchaser" is a natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investment securities. Id.
§ 2(a)(51)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2006).
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There is an exemption from registration as an investment adviser for
small advisors who have had fewer than fifteen clients, do not hold
themselves out generally to the public as an investment adviser, and do
not act as an investment adviser to any registered investment
company.187 The key to the long-time exemption for hedge funds and
other private investment funds doing business as limited partnerships
was that the managing partner was considered to have only one client-
the limited partnership. 188 This safe harbor was adopted in 1985,189 but
the SEC attempted to eliminate it by a rule changing the definition of the
term "client," so that each shareholder or beneficiary of a private fund
would be considered a separate client in counting the fifteen clients for
an exemption under the Investment Advisers Act. 190  Two SEC
commissioners dissented from the promulgation of this rule,' 91 leading
to an appeal. The D.C. Circuit Court in Goldstein v. SEC 192 struck down
the rule as beyond the SEC's authority. This situation challenged the
SEC and Congress to decide whether the securities laws needed to be
amended to give the SEC authority to regulate hedge funds.
This challenge was taken up by Senators Grassley and Levin who
have introduced the Hedge Fund Transparency Act, 193 which would give
the SEC authority to regulate all pooled investment vehicles that manage
at least $50 million in assets as investment companies, including hedge
funds. This is a different and potentially much broader authority than
the SEC sought in its 2004 rulemaking. Whether such a bill would
become law, however, remains unclear because of the vagaries of
current regulatory reform legislation. 1
94
The Obama Administration proposed legislation to regulate the
advisors to hedge funds and force them to register with the SEC. '95 This
187. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-I (2006), invalidated by Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). The safe harbor provided for in this rule would also apply to private funds doing business as
corporations, LLCs, or trusts.
189. Definition of "Client" of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to Limited
Partnerships, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-983, 50 Fed. Reg. 29206 (July 18, 1985). The
initial safe harbor was an effort to clarify that a general partner to a limited partnership was advising the
partnership and not the partners individually.
190. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; Final Rule,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dee. 10, 2004). Private equity and
venture capital funds were exempted.
191. Id. at 72,089 (Commissioners Glassman and Atkins, dissenting).
192. 451 F.3d at 882-84.
193. S. 334, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
194. See Kara Scannell, Frank Backs Regulator for Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at
C3.
195. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Registration of Advisors to Private Funds (2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/title /20iv /20reg /2Oadvisers /20priv /20funds /207/
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proposal has been considered by the House Committee on Financial
Services. 196 This statute would eliminate the private advisor exemption
for all but certain foreign advisors and would require all domestic
advisors with assets under management of more than $150 million to
register with the SEC.197 The proposal would also remove the provision
of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940198 that prohibits the government
from requiring investment advisors to disclose the identity, investment,
or affairs of any client (other than in connection with enforcement
matters), and would grant the SEC such reports about private funds "as
are necessary or apropriate in the public interest and for the assessment
of systemic risk.' 1 9 It would also require advisers to provide the SEC
reports, records, and documents to investors, prospective investors,
counterparties, and creditors of the private funds they advise. 200  The
SEC would then share these documents with the Federal Reserve Board
and with any other entity that the SEC would identify as having systemic
risk responsibility. 20 1 This proposed bill would explicitly allow the SEC
to define terms in the Investment Advisors Act through its rulemaking
authority, and thus reverse Goldstein.2 °2
If hedge funds are to be regulated as investment advisors, the Bernie
Madoff scandal and other Ponzi schemes have raised the question of
how regulation of investment advisors should be reformed. The issue is
not simply lax or incompetent enforcement by the SEC-as members of
Congress trying to slough off their responsibility for the financial
meltdown would have the public believe. Rather, the Investment
Advisors Act has long been a skimpy and inadequate statute, and the
SEC staff available for inspections of investment advisors is too small
and not sufficiently sophisticated. Advisors have no other regulator, as
they are not required to be FINRA members, as are broker-dealers.
There are two grounds for regulating hedge funds. First, not all their
customers are as sophisticated as the SEC has assumed, and many need
to be protected to the same extent as other public investors. Second, the
very large hedge funds pose a systemic risk to the financial system.
Some reform proposals would require all hedge funds to register with
the SEC, probably as investment advisors, but possibly as Investment
2015%2009%20fnl.pdf. (last visited February 28, 2010) [hereinafter Registration of Advisers].
196. H.R. 3818, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
197. Id. § 403, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3a. (2006).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-80b-2 (2006).
199. Registration of Advisers, supra note 195, at §§ 404(b), 405, H.R. 3818, 111 th Cong. § 4
(2009).
200. Id.
201. H.R. 3818, 11 1th Cong. § 4 (2009).
202. H.R. 3818, 11 lth Cong. § 7 (2009).
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Companies. 20 3 Other proposals would require all hedge funds above a
certain size to be regulated by a financial stability regulator, along with
bank holding companies, investment bank holding companies, and
insurance holding companies with assets over a designated dollar
amount.2 °4 One problem with creating such a financial stability
regulator is that sometimes small financial institutions create systemic
risks.2 °5 Regardless of whether large hedge funds come under the
surveillance of a systemic regulator, hedge fund managers should be
required to register with the SEC as investment advisers, as
recommended by the Obama Treasury Department. Further, in order to
strengthen investment advisor regulation, forcing investment advisers
into an SRO, as broker-dealers are forced to join FINRA, should be
considered.
V. CONCLUSION
Consolidating the SEC and the CFTC would lead to better regulation
of the markets for several reasons. First, the jurisdictional squabbling
between these agencies that led to the de-regulation of credit default
swaps and other OTC derivatives would end and the agency could
concentrate on what regulation is in the public interest and not the
interest of their own agencies and congressional oversight committees'
interests. The combined agency must consider what products have an
economic function for the general economy and not simply the
exchanges trading them; what investor protections are needed in the
securities and commodities markets; how to curb excessive speculation;
and how to prevent systemic risk. Even if new systemic or prudential
regulators are created, or the Federal Reserve Board regulates the capital
adequacy of large investment bank holding companies and hedge funds,
the SEC or a consolidated SEC-CFTC will still need to focus on
preventing systemic risk in the markets and safeguarding customer
securities and funds held by broker-dealers and others.
Second, a consolidated SEC and CFTC would be a bigger, and
presumably more prestigious and powerful agency than either the SEC
or CFTC, separately and therefore better able to guard against agency
203. See Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 334, 111 th Cong. (2009).
204. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Outline Framework For Regulatory Reform
(Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm.
205. The 1974 collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt, a small German bank sent shock waves throughout
the global financial system. See 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
20 (2002).
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capture. 20 6  The day after President Obama's inauguration, the
Government Accounting Office released a framework for assessing
financial regulatory reform proposals.20 7 It proposed the following
analytical standards: clearly defined regulatory goals that are sufficiently
comprehensive and have a system-wide focus; a regulatory system that
is both flexible and adaptable, and efficient and effective; consistent
consumer and investor protection standards; and consistent financial
oversight and minimal taxpayer expense. One of the most important
points in this framework is that "[r]egulators should have independence
from inappropriate influence, as well as prominence and authority to
carry out and enforce statutory missions.,
20 8
Third, as a former SEC commissioner, I lament the criticism of the
SEC during the financial crisis and hope that the agency will be
reinvigorated and returned to its former position of prestige and respect.
Change in the SEC's organization and mandates for its regulation would
assist in this regard. As a believer in the value of independent agency
regulation, I think that putting all regulatory functions into one or two
executive branch agencies is a bad idea. Having a super-regulator for
financial institutions is appealing because responsibility for errors can be
assigned, banking, securities origination and trading, commodities
trading, and insurance underwriting are not really the same businesses
and should not necessarily be regulated identically. Yet our financial
regulatory system is balkanized so that all regulators are responsible for
the current crisis, and yet no single regulator is responsible.
Accordingly, some consolidation, particularly of the SEC and CFTC,
would help address this problem.
In the absence of consolidation of the SEC and CFTC (and a similar
consolidation of all the federal banking agencies, a topic not discussed in
this Article), it is essential that financial regulators better coordinate and
harmonize their regulations. Allowing regulated entities to choose their
regulators is a prescription for weak regulation. Further, when
regulators engage in boosterism for industries they are supposed to be
regulating, the regulatory system is corrupted. This does not mean that
regulators should view every regulated entity with suspicion and as a
target for enforcement action, but with a healthy skepticism of industry
claims about how damaging regulation will be.
206. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: Hearing Before H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 143 (2008) (testimony of Joel Seligman).
207. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING
AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
(2009).
208. Id. at 2.
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For about the past decade, regulators have been too willing to credit
claims by financial firms that their businesses will move offshore if U.S.
regulation is too tough. Although U.S. regulators must manage the
challenges of globalization in structuring new regulation to deal with the
aftermath of the current crisis, 20 9 the financial meltdown in the United
States has demonstrated that when regulation in the United States fails,
the entire global financial system suffers. This should be sufficient
deterrence to regulatory competition between major market regulators
that need to cooperate to improve the regulation of all financial
institutions. If the United States improves its faulty regulatory system, it
can lead the way to better regulation everywhere.
This Article argues that regardless of the SEC's future organization,
securities credit needs to be curtailed; broker-dealer capital adequacy
rules need to be revised; OTC derivatives need to be regulated; the SEC
should consider a new short sale rule; hedge fund managers should be
required to register with the SEC as investment advisors; and investment
advisor regulation should be improved. This a huge agenda, and while
some of these tasks could, and may, be given to a new (hopefully
independent) financial stability regulator, most of this work should, and
probably will, fall to either the SEC or a combined SEC and CFTC.
209. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, (Chicago Booth School of Business,
Working Paper No. 08-27), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1319648.
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